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Abstract
We run a laboratory experiment were friendshipnetworks are generated
endogenously within an anonymous group. Our experiment builds on two
phases in sequence: a network formation game and a trust game. We nd
that in those sessions where the trust game is played before the network
formation game, the overall level of trust is not signicantly di¤erent from
the one observed in a simple trust game; in those sessions where the trust
game is played after the network formation game we nd that the overall
level of trust is signicantly lower than in the simple trust game. Hence
surprisingly trust does not increase because of enforced reciprocityand
moreover a common social history does a¤ect the level of trust, but in a
negative manner. Where network e¤ects matter is in the choice of whom
to trust: while we tend to trust less on average those with whom we have
already interacted compared to total strangers, past history allows us to
select whom to trust relatively more than others.
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1 Introduction
Do we trust friends better than strangers? Most of us do. But why? Are they
trustworthy because they are our friends, or are they our friends because they
are trustworthy?
A long-standing puzzle in experimental economics if why do we trust at all.
While trust among strangers is di¢ cult to reconcile with rationality and has
typically been o¤ered behavioural explanations in the literature, in a repeated
interaction setting such as the one represented by friendship trust can be fully
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reconciled with rationality. We can think of at least two possible explanations:
if we anticipate that we are going to have future occasions to interact we may
rationally choose to behave cooperatively in fear of future retaliation (enforced
reciprocity); on the other hand, we know our friends and on the basis of their
past behaviour we are able to tell if they are trustworthy and likely to reciprocate
in the future.
Leider et al (2007) run a large scale eld experiment where they map real
friendship networks among university students and measure trust as a function
of the social distance between them. They nd that being friends increases the
level of trust above what could be explained by altruistic preferences (absolute
trust) and argue that di¤erential trust is caused by repeated interaction.
We run a laboratory experiment were friendshipnetworks are generated en-
dogenously within an anonymous group. While these networks do not replicate
the complexity of real world friendship, they nevertheless possess the features of
repeated interaction that have been claimed to explain di¤erential trust. Com-
pared to eld experiments, the laboratory setting has the clear advantage to
be able to control the endogeneity of the network formation and therefore to
disentangle the di¤erential trust that can be attributed to repeated interaction
from any other possible explanation that may a¤ect both trust and friendship
formation1 .
Our experiment builds on two phases in sequence: a network formation
game, where experimental subjects make choices on potentially benecial net-
work connections, and a trust game. The trust game is played only once, while
the network formation game is a repeated game with a random stopping rule.
We run two treatments: one with the trust game followed by the network for-
mation game and one with the sequence played the other way around. As a
control, experimental subjects play the trust game on its own.
If the higher level of trust documented across friends occurs because of en-
forced reciprocity, then subjects should trust and reciprocate more in those ses-
sions where they know that a network formation game follows the trust game.
Similarly, if one trusts friends more because a common social history has re-
vealed them as trustworthy, we expect to nd higher level of trust in those
sessions where the trust game follows the network formation game. None of
these two expectations nds support in our results. We nd that in those ses-
sions where the trust game is played before the network formation game, the
overall level of trust is not signicantly di¤erent from the one observed in a
simple trust game: hence we do not appear to nd support for the claim that
we may trust friends more because we fear future retaliation. In those sessions
where the trust game is played after the network formation game we nd that
the overall level of trust is signicantly lower than in the simple trust game:
hence a common social history does a¤ect the level of trust, but in a negative
1Attractiveness, for example, a¤ects the level of trust (Eckel and Wilson, 2006); cultural
di¤erences (Bornhost et al, 2004a), gender (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Eckel and Gross-
man, 2006; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002, Eckel and Wilson, 2003) and race (Glaeser et al,
2000) have an impact on the level of cooperation among experimental subjects. Naturally
friendship formation may also be inuenced by the same variables.
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manner. Where network e¤ects matter is in the choice of whom to trust: while
we tend to trust less on average those with whom we have already interacted
compared to total strangers, past history allows us to select whom to trust
relatively more than others.
1.1 Literature review
Since a seminal article by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), an extensive
experimental literature has developed aiming to document and explain trust.
Complementing experimental with survey data, a large literature starting from
Glaeser et al (2000) also attempts to measure trust and to identify its empirical
correlates in variables such as gender (see also Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004;
Eckel and Grossman, 2006; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002, Eckel and Wilson,
2003), race (see also Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001), family status, social status
and connections (the already cited Leider et al, 2007, but also Goeree et al,
2007). This literature is so vast that we do not attempt a review here and we
focus instead on those contributions to which our paper and results can be more
directly compared.
The trust game that we consider here is di¤erent from the standard trust
game in many respects. While the usual setting involves two subjects with
distinct roles (sender and recipient), here we allow 6 subjects to choose simul-
taneously whom to trust with an o¤er. Hence in our setting: subjects choose
whom to trust; they play both roles in the trust game; each subject may re-
ceive o¤ers from more than one sender (and potentially reciprocate with each
of them). Some of these features have already been considered in the litera-
ture, but not all of them within the same setting. Eckel and Wilson (2003) nd
that choosing the partner in a trust game increases both the level of trust and
reciprocity. Burks, Carpenter and Verhoogen (2003) show that playing both
roles in the trust game reduces the level of trust. They attribute this nding to
a reduced responsibility e¤ect : senders do not take full responsibility for their
recipientsnal winnings, being aware that they will in turn play as senders.
The main innovation in our setup is in the fact that a one-shot trust game
module is combined with a network formation phase. When network formation
is played rst, the trust game is no longer anonymous since participants know
each other from the network formation game2 . From this point of view our
trust game shares common features with the experimental literature on partners
versus strangers: in a public good game, Andreoni and Croson (2001) test the
behaviour of players in a repeated game (partners) and in a repeated single-
shot game (strangers) and nd that strangers cooperate signicantly more than
partners. If the network game follows the trust game, overall interaction is no
longer one-shot as there is a continuation after the trust game. Bornhorst et al
(2004b) study a nitely repeated trust game and nd that level of trust is higher
than in one-shot games and declines over time. They attribute this nding to
learning.
2Real world identities are never revealed, but experimental subjects are identied by the
same label across the two games.
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2 Experimental Design
The experiment was run at the Center for Experimental Economics at Roma Est
(CESARE, LUISS) with a sample of 108 undergraduates in Economics. Each
subject participated in only one session and none had previously participated
in a similar experiment. Subjects were randomly matched in groups of 6 and
invited to reach the laboratory at di¤erent times. Upon arrival, each group was
distributed detailed instructions3 for the experiment and seating was assigned
by the experimenters. The instructions were read aloud and time was allowed
for questions. In a questionnaire run at the end of the session students con-
rmed that both the instructions and the experimental design were clear. The
experiment was conducted by using a computerised setup4 and communication
among subjects in the room was prevented both by appropriately distanced
seating and invigilation.
Each session lasted approximately 40 minutes and was composed of two
phases in sequence: a trust game and a network formation game. At the be-
ginning of each session subjects were informed that the experiment consisted of
the two phases in sequence and they were told that the computer would inform
them which of the two phases to play rst. They were also informed that at the
end of the session they had to complete a questionnaire5 .
We run a total of 18 sessions in 3 treatments: 6 sessions with network for-
mation rst; 6 sessions with trust game rst and 6 control sessions with trust
game only. Subjects total earnings were determined by the sum of the prots
in each phase and were paid using a conversion rate of 100 points per euro.
2.1 The network formation game
The experimental implementation of the network formation game is as in Di
Cagno and Sciubba (2007) and follows the theoretical framework in Goyal and
Joshi (2003). The idea is that agents can propose links to one another. Pro-
posals of links are unilateral, but links are established only if mutually agreed.
The purpose of establishing links is that agents earn benets for each other par-
ticipant that they are able to reach through their network: benets are earned
not only through those that are reached directly, but also through those that
agents reach indirectly, through the connections made by others. While only
direct links are costly, all connections, both direct and indirect, are benecial in
the same way. Hence the aim for a prot maximising agent is to reach as many
nodes as possible with the minimum number of direct links (the equilibrium
network is minimally connected: all agents are included and there are no re-
dundant links). Players pay a cost for established links, but not for unmatched
proposals.
Sessions consisted of a minimum of 15 rounds, with a random stopping rule
3See appendix.
4We thank Andrea Lombardo (InformaRoma) for developing very nice software.
5See appendix.
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determining the end of the experiment6 . The initial screen for each participant
is shown in gure 1a.
Figure 1a: The initial screen.
Participants are represented on the screen by di¤erent symbols which we
considered neutral in that they do not provide subjects any particular clue
when deciding to establish a link with another player in the group7 . Subjects
do not know their symbol (or the other participantssymbols) in advance and
can identify themselves on the screen because their symbol is circled in red. The
screen also displays the relevant parameters for the session at play. In particular
the initial endowment that participants have at their disposal, the unitary cost
for established links and the unitary benet for reached nodes.
In each round subjects are asked to submit (anonymously and independently)
their choice of intended links: they can do so by ticking the relevant boxes on the
right-hand side of the screen. After all subjects have conrmed their choices, the
computer checks which links are mutually desired and activates them. At the
end of each round payo¤s are computed and displayed on the screen. Great care
was put in making sure that all information available to experimental subjects
was provided in a user-friendly way. For this reason the graphical interface was
designed so that actual links were visualised on the screen as a graph, rather
than as a list of activated ties, or as a matrix of 0/1 connections.
6At the end of round 15 (and of each additional round after that), a lottery administered
by the computer decided if an additional round had to be played. The probability of new
rounds was xed at 50%. The lottery was visualised on participantsscreens as two ashing
buttons, one red (with a NO sign) and one green (with a YES sign).
7 In this setting we want to avoid any salient coordination device that induces coordination
on a particular network. In the pilot for a network formation experiment (see Di Cagno and
Sciubba (2005)) we labeled participants with A,B,C,D,E,F and we found that the alphabetical
ordering was explaining most of the networking decisions. See also Galizzi and Bernasconi
(2005) and Falk and Kosfeld (2003).
5
As an example, Figure 1b shows the participantsscreen at the end of round
number 4. It displays the graph of all active links, total revenues, costs and
prots in the round. It also provides information on unmatched proposals: each
subject is informed of those players who have proposed a link to them but whom
they have not reciprocated. At any time during the experiment participants
have access to a great deal of information on past history: by clicking on the
bar corresponding to each round they are able to visualise the graph of active
links, prots obtained, and all other information relevant to that round.
Figure 1b: The participantsscreen at the end of round 4.
2.2 The trust game
The trust game is played by a group of 6 subjects. This is the same group that
plays the network formation game and each participant in the group is identied
by the same icon that also identies him/her in the network formation game
(which may precede or follow).
All subjects are freshly endowed with 1000 experimental units and have the
possibility to choose to donate any integer amount between 0 and 1000 to one
and only one subject of their choice within the same group. When the trust
game is played before the network formation game, the trust game is completely
anonymous. When the trust game is played after the network formation game,
participants have observed others past behaviour in the network formation
phase.
O¤ers are collected by the computer, multiplied by 3 and shown on the
screen of the receivers.
Receivers observe the icon corresponding to the donors and have the possi-
bility to reciprocate by sending back a sum between 0 and the amount received
(in turn, equal to 3 times the o¤er made by the donor). When more than one
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o¤er is received, beneciaries have the opportunity to reciprocate with each in-
dividual donor according to the same rules. Subjects are aware that the trust
game is played only once. In those sessions where the trust game is played rst,
subjects are also aware that a network formation game will follow and that the
same identities will be carried over.
2.3 Treatments
We run a total of 18 sessions: 6 sessions with network formation rst (treatment
1); 6 sessions with trust game rst (treatment 2); and 6 control sessions with
trust game only (control).
For the network formation phase we used two sets of parameters: in partic-
ular 6 sessions (3 from treatment 1 and 3 from treatment 2) involved a lower
cost of link formation; 6 sessions (3 from treatment 1 and 3 from treatment 2)
involved a higher cost of link formation. Initial endowment and unitary benet
were kept constant across sessions. In the trust game phase the initial endow-
ment was kept equal to 1000 throughout. In more detail, parameters for all
sessions are presented in the table below:
Subjects Phase
played
first
Network phase Trust phase
Initial
endowment
Unitary
cost
Unitary
benefit
Initial
endowment
Treatment 1
Sessions 1-3 6 Network 500 90 100 1000
Sessions 4-6 6 Network 500 120 100 1000
Treatment 2
Sessions 7-9 6 Trust 500 90 100 1000
Sessions 10-12 6 Trust 500 120 100 1000
Control
Treatment
Sessions 13-18 6 - - - - 1000
All relevant parameters were equal across participants and displayed on the
screen at any time throughout the experiment.
2.4 Questionnaire
At the end of all sessions the computer administered a simple multiple-choice
questionnaire to gather basic demographic information and trust indicators for
the experimental subjects. The complete questionnaire is in the appendix. Sum-
mary statistics for the answers obtained are reported below.
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TREATMENT 1 2
What is your sex? (% female) 36.11 13.89
Have you a brother or a sister? (% yes) 63.89 66.67
2.78 5.55
54.89 52.78Where are you from? (% north, % center, % south)
33.33 41.67
Are you satisfied with the amount you earned during the experiment? (% no) 52.78 44.44
Were the instructions and the experiment clear? (% no) 36.11 27.78
Do you think that you would have earned more if you had more experience with this game? (%
yes)
19.44 13.89
Do you like to share things with your friends? (% no) 25 19.44
You have forgotten your watch in the university lavatories. Do you expect that you will find it
there when you go back? (% no)
50 83.33
You have lost your wallet on a bus. Do you expect it will be given back to you? (% no) 58.33 69.44
You are sharing a lottery ticket with some friends, but the ticket is with them. In case you win, do
you expect that your friends will share the prize? (% no)
16.67 8.33
We tested whether demographics and reported trust indicators matter in
explaining observed di¤erences across the two treatments, however we could
not detect any signicant role of these variables (see tables in the appendix).
3 Results
3.1 Network formation
Tables 1 and 2 provide some descriptive statistics for the network formation
phase. In particular table 1 groups sessions by treatment and table 2 groups
sessions by cost parameters. While the study of how behaviour in the trust game
may a¤ect subjectss choices in the network formation stage is outside the scope
of the present paper, it is nevertheless interesting to notice that there do not
seem to be obvious ways in which the network formation phase di¤ers across
the two treatments. The average number of proposals and links established
by each subject does not seem to di¤er across treatments (2.22 proposals and
1.37 links in treatment 1, versus 2.38 proposals and 1.34 links in treatment
2). The number of connections that is secured through a single direct link
is higher when the network game follows the trust game (2.03 in treatment
2 versus 1.75 in treatment 1). This may be interpreted as a higher level of
e¢ ciency attained whenever trust is established before link formation starts: if
more connections are attained on average through fewer direct links, this implies
that there are fewer redundant links. However it is not clear whether this is due
to improved coordination, since the indication that we have by comparing the
ratios of proposals to links goes in the opposite direction: in treatment 1 it
takes 1.59 proposals on average to secure a link; when the trust game is played
rst (treatment 2) it takes subjects 1.8 proposals instead. Also, average prots
earned by subjects in the network formation phase in the two treatments are
2382 and 1800 in treatments 1 and 2 respectively. Hence network formation
does not seem to be more e¢ cient when trust is played rst.
More in general we do not detect any major di¤erences in the way in which
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networks are formed across treatments and in both cases the results conform
to the ones obtained in Di Cagno and Sciubba (2007) where no trust game was
played.
Session Rounds Links Connections Conn/Links Proposals Prop/Links
1 15 2.13 4 1.88 3.12 1.46
2 20 1.8 4.15 2.31 2.72 1.51
3 20 1.23 2.43 1.98 2.23 1.81
4 18 1.24 1.3 1.05 2.32 1.87
5 18 0.57 0.68 1.19 0.6 1.05
6 18 1.26 2.67 2.12 2.34 1.86
avg 1.37 2.54 1.75 2.22 1.59
var 0.29 1.95 0.26 0.74 0.10
7 15 1.29 2.69 2.09 2.59 2.01
8 17 1.73 3.61 2.09 2.87 1.66
9 16 1.54 3.17 2.06 2.79 1.81
10 19 1.46 3.51 2.40 2.3 1.58
11 15 1.02 1.8 1.76 1.78 1.75
12 20 0.98 1.75 1.79 1.94 1.98
avg 1.34 2.76 2.03 2.38 1.80
var 0.09 0.68 0.06 0.20 0.03
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on network formation, by treatment.
Table 2 shows that as far as network formation is concerned most of the
action lies in cost di¤erences: in low cost sessions (1-3 and 7-9) the number of
proposals and links are signicantly higher than in high cost sessions (4-6 and
10-12). As expected prots are much lower in high cost sessions (average prot
886) than in low cost ones (average prot 3297).
Session Rounds Links Connections Conn/Links Proposals Prop/Links
1 15 2.13 4 1.88 3.12 1.46
2 20 1.8 4.15 2.31 2.72 1.51
3 20 1.23 2.43 1.98 2.23 1.81
7 15 1.29 2.69 2.09 2.59 2.01
8 17 1.73 3.61 2.09 2.87 1.66
9 16 1.54 3.17 2.06 2.79 1.81
avg 1.62 3.34 2.06 2.72 1.71
var 0.11 0.49 0.02 0.09 0.04
4 18 1.24 1.3 1.05 2.32 1.87
5 18 0.57 0.68 1.19 0.6 1.05
6 18 1.26 2.67 2.12 2.34 1.86
10 19 1.46 3.51 2.40 2.3 1.58
11 15 1.02 1.8 1.76 1.78 1.75
12 20 0.98 1.75 1.79 1.94 1.98
avg 1.09 1.95 1.72 1.88 1.68
var 0.10 1.01 0.27 0.45 0.11
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on network formation, by cost parameters.
Figures 2a and 2b provide typical examples of network formation for low
cost (session 2 displayed here) and high cost (session 12 displayed here) sessions.
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There are a few features that are common across low cost sessions and worth
noticing: the number of links that subjects succeed in establishing increases
after the rst few rounds; although there is a tendency to include more and more
subjects in the network, some remain isolated at times; some links are recurrent
over time (see, for example, the link between subjects 1 and 4, and 1 and 5);
some subjects emerge as hubs for a star network across agents (in session 2
subject 1 takes this role). Session 12 is quite typical of high cost sessions, with
a much lower number of links established: as for low cost sessions, we notice
here that the few persistent links are across the same subjects (link between 4
and 6; and between 1 and 6).
Session 2
ROUND N° 15
ROUND N° 16 ROUND N° 17 ROUND N° 18 ROUND N° 19 ROUND N° 20
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Figure 2a: Network formation in session 2 (treatment 1, low cost).
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Session 12
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Figure 2b: Network formation in session 12 (treatment 2, high cost).
3.2 Trust game
We run 6 control sessions where subjects played our version of the trust game
only. Interestingly the results obtained here show that the modied framework
does not change the main qualitative results that have been long established by
the experimental literature. All subjects made a positive o¤er, ranging from a
minimum of 100 to a maximum of 1000. On average subjects donated slightly
more than half of their endowment (average o¤er of 578); 20 over the 36 re-
cipients reciprocated the o¤er and those who did sent back an average amount
equal to 50% of the o¤er received.
Results are shown in table 3 and gure 3.
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Session Proposer Recipient Offered Sent Back Ratio
TG1 1 5 600 300 0.50
TG1 2 4 300 200 0.67
TG1 3 5 100 100 1.00
TG1 4 3 100 200 2.00
TG1 5 4 100 100 1.00
TG1 6 3 200 300 1.50
TG2 1 5 1000 0 0.00
TG2 2 3 500 800 1.60
TG2 3 1 400 400 1.00
TG2 4 3 500 600 1.20
TG2 5 4 300 100 0.33
TG2 6 3 300 400 1.33
TG3 1 3 1000 0 0.00
TG3 2 1 800 800 1.00
TG3 3 1 1000 0 0.00
TG3 4 5 1000 0 0.00
TG3 5 6 700 0 0.00
TG3 6 1 700 600 0.86
TG4 1 2 1000 0 0.00
TG4 2 3 500 0 0.00
TG4 3 4 750 0 0.00
TG4 4 5 800 0 0.00
TG4 5 6 850 500 0.59
TG4 6 1 700 0 0.00
TG5 1 2 500 100 0.20
TG5 2 5 500 300 0.60
TG5 3 6 120 0 0.00
TG5 4 1 200 50 0.25
TG5 5 3 100 150 1.50
TG5 6 1 300 0 0.00
TG6 1 2 930 0 0.00
TG6 2 3 850 50 0.06
TG6 3 4 900 0 0.00
TG6 4 5 1000 700 0.70
TG6 5 1 300 0 0.00
TG6 6 1 930 0 0.00
AVG 578.61 187.5 0.50
Table 3: Trust game, control treatment.
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Figure 3: Trust game, control treatment.
The most striking result from treatment 1 is that when the trust game is
played after the network formation game subjects trust signicantly less than in
the control treatment: the average o¤er is equal to 232 (whereas it is 579 in the
control); moreover while all subjects made a strictly positive o¤er in the control
treatment, here 7 (over 36) subjects decided not to o¤er anything to anyone.
For reciprocity the results are not too dissimilar for what we have in the control:
21 out of the 29 subjects who received a positive o¤er reciprocated by sending
back an average of 48% of the donation received. Results for treatment 1 are
shown in table 4 and gure 4.
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Session Proposer Recipient Offered Sent back Ratio
1 1 2 0
1 2 4 500 500 100%
1 3 1 100 0 0%
1 4 2 450 200 44%
1 5 6 100 10 10%
1 6 5 300 200 67%
2 1 2 0
2 2 3 200 0 0%
2 3 6 100 40 40%
2 4 6 100 50 50%
2 5 1 100 150 150%
2 6 1 0
3 1 2 100 100 100%
3 2 3 800 400 50%
3 3 1 0
3 4 5 300 300 100%
3 5 6 100 100 100%
3 6 4 100 50 50%
4 1 2 0
4 2 4 400 100 25%
4 3 2 0
4 4 1 400 400 100%
4 5 4 300 100 33%
4 6 2 100 50 50%
5 1 5 400 0 0%
5 2 1 0
5 3 2 500 500 100%
5 4 6 500 100 20%
5 5 3 400 400 100%
5 6 3 100 100 100%
6 1 5 300 0 0%
6 2 5 100 0 0%
6 3 5 900 100 11%
6 4 3 200 0 0%
6 5 3 300 0 0%
6 6 1 100 0 0%
AVG 231.94 136.21 0.48
Table 4: Trust game, treatment 1.
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Figure 4: Trust game, treatment 1.
Per contrast, the results from treatment 2 are equally unexpected but for the
opposite reason. When the trust game is followed by a network formation game
there is no signicant increase in the level of trust compared to the simple trust
game. Only one subject did not o¤er (while everyone o¤ered in the control)
and the average o¤er was equal to 552 (versus 579 in the control). Repeated
interaction that follows has more of an impact on reciprocity: 25 out of 35
people reciprocated (as opposed to 20 out of 36) by sending back an average
amount equal to 68% (rather than 50%) of the amount received. Results for
treatment 2 are shown in table 5 and gure 5.
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Session Proposer Recipient Offered Sent Back Ratio
7 1 5 300 150 0.50
7 2 4 100 150 1.50
7 3 5 200 300 1.50
7 4 3 50 75 1.50
7 5 4 100 0 0.00
7 6 3 1000 600 0.60
8 1 3 1000 0 0.00
8 2 1 1000 0 0.00
8 3 1 100 0 0.00
8 4 5 1000 0 0.00
8 5 6 500 0 0.00
8 6 1 800 0 0.00
9 1 2 1000 1500 1.50
9 2 3 15 20 1.33
9 3 4 500 300 0.60
9 4 5 1000 3000 3.00
9 5 6 600 20 0.03
9 6 1 500 300 0.60
10 1 5 500 0 0.00
10 2 3 0
10 3 1 1000 500 0.50
10 4 3 500 0 0.00
10 5 4 500 0 0.00
10 6 3 150 100 0.67
11 1 2 1000 1000 1.00
11 2 5 1000 20 0.02
11 3 6 200 300 1.50
11 4 1 1000 500 0.50
11 5 3 1000 1500 1.50
11 6 1 1000 1500 1.50
12 1 2 2 3 1.50
12 2 3 1000 1 0.00
12 3 4 200 100 0.50
12 4 5 300 300 1.00
12 5 1 150 2 0.01
12 6 1 600 600 1.00
AVG 551.86 366.89 0.68
Table 5: Trust game, treatment 2.
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Figure 5: Trust game, treatment 2.
3.3 Networks and trust
In order to understand the impact of network formation on trust we run several
OLS regressions to explain the amount o¤ered and the amount sent back as a
function of subjectsbehaviour in the network formation game. We also added
demographic data and trust indicators made available through a questionnaire
run at the end of each session.
For the amount o¤ered we propose that it is a function of: total number of
direct links of the sender in the network formation phase; total number of direct
links of the receiver; number of times that the sender proposed to the receiver;
number of times that the sender failed to have his/her proposal to the receiver
matched; prot of the sender in the network game; whether the session was a
high or low cost one for link formation. Results for treatment 1 and 2 are in
tables 6a and 6b respectively.
Dependent Variable: amount that i sends to j
Coefficient Std. Error P-Value
  links of i in session (cum) -5.57 6.55 0.405
  links of j in session (cum) -9.44 3.66 0.017
  i proposed to j in session (cum) 37.86 17.75 0.044
  i failed with j in session (cum) -35.58 16.60 0.043
  i’s profit in network game -0.01 0.03 0.771
 high cost session 56.91 113.30 0.620
Constant 354.73 163.98 0.042
Number of observations: 29
  R2    0.4331   Robust standard errors
Table 6a: Amount o¤ered, OLS regression, treatment 1.
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Dependent Variable: amount that i sends to j
Coefficient Std. Error P-Value
  links of i in session (cum) 13.39 8.06 0.108
  links of j in session (cum) 3.22 8.01 0.691
  i proposed to j in session (cum) 1.93 20.35 0.925
  i failed with j in session (cum) 5.72 30.08 0.850
  i’s profit in network game 0.11 0.09 0.229
  high cost session 120.89 267.04 0.654
Constant -113.90 400.91 0.778
Number of observations: 35
  R2    0.1842   Robust standard errors
Table 6b: Amount o¤ered, OLS regression, treatment 2.
As expected, the results are very di¤erent across treatments. In treatment
2, where the network formation game only occurs after the trust game has
already been played, none of the network variables is signicant in explaining
the amount o¤ered. We take this to conrm that any signicance detected in
treatment 1 depends exclusively on the sequentiality between the two phases
and it is not to be attributed to other variables that jointly determine both the
level of trust and subjectsbehaviour in the network game.
In treatment 1 we nd that donors make larger o¤ers to those with whom
they have succeeded in establishing frequent relationships: the amount o¤ered is
increasing in the number of times that the donor has proposed to the recipient,
but decreasing in the number of times that the recipient has failed to reciprocate
such proposals. Moreover o¤ers tend to be larger when recipients do not have
many links in place. It would seem that trust is established through frequent
but exclusive relationships: subjects donate to those that they have been linked
to and that have been linked with not too many others.
We test for signicance of demographic factors and trust indicators. We do
this in a OLS regression over both treatments, to nd that none matters8 .
As for the amount sent back, we nd that in both treatments it mostly
depends on the amount received (with a coe¢ cient of approximately 0.5). When
the trust game is played after the network formation game, the recipient sends
back a smaller amount when his/her prot in the network formation game has
been smaller and in those sessions where the network formation involved higher
costs, which again will have impacted negatively on recipientsprots. Having
established reliable links in the network formation phase has no signicance in
explaining reciprocity and trustworthiness. Results for treatments 1 and 2 are
shown in tables 7a and 7b respectively.
8See table in the appendix.
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Dependent Variable: amount that j returns to i
Coefficient Std. Error P-Value
  amount offered by i 0.51 0.13 0.001
  links of i in session (cum) 0.73 6.94 0.917
  links of j in session (cum) 1.93 2.01 0.346
j proposed to i in session (cum) -12.02 12.87 0.361
 j failed with i in session (cum) 5.03 14.35 0.729
j’s profit in network game -0.06 0.03 0.065
high cost session -223.90 63.06 0.002
Constant 285.87 136.23 0.048
Number of observations: 29
  R2    0.5284   Robust standard errors
Table 7a: Amount sent back, OLS regression, treatment 1.
Dependent Variable: amount that j returnstoi
Coefficient Std. Error P-Value
  amount offered byi 0.43 0.16 0.012
  links of i insession (cum) -4.20 2.56 0.113
  links of j insession (cum) 0.94 2.83 0.741
  j proposed toi in session (cum) -8.58 10.99 0.442
  j failed withi in session (cum) -1.04 13.88 0.941
  j’s profit in network game -0.003 0.05 0.944
high cost session -141.70 158.94 0.381
Constant 248.62 180.12 0.179
Number of observations: 35
  R2    0.5027   Robust standard errors
Table 7b: Amount sent back, OLS regression, treatment 2.
Again, in our regressions for reciprocity demographics and trust indicators
do not matter. However agents are less trustworthy if they have been unsatised
by the amount of money that they have earned in the experiment9 .
9See table in the appendix.
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4 Concluding Remarks
By comparing the results obtained in the di¤erent treatments for the trust
game, we nd that history of play in the network formation game matters in
determining the direction of trust. In choosing whom to trust, subjects select
those with whom they have established stable links over time, by o¤ering them
relatively more than they do to the others. However the overall level of trust is
lower when participants have known each other through the network formation
game than when they play the trust game with complete strangers.
Going back to the eld experiments results that observe more trust among
friends, our analysis seems to suggest that neither reinforced reciprocity, nor
signalling, are su¢ cient to explain the observed higher level of trust. It would
seem in fact that a history of social interaction where both retaliation (treatment
2) and signalling (treatment 1) are possible, does not necessarily imply that
participants trust each other more. In our setting past interaction has been
protable for some, but less so for others: those who were often isolated or
failed to establish preferential links with others tend to trust less.
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Appendix
SESSION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
What is your sex? (% female) 83.33 16.67 66.67 0 16.67 33.33 0 0 33.33 0 16.67 50
Have you a brother or a
sister? (% yes)
83.33 16.67 83.33 66.67 66.67 66.67 50 50 66.67 66.67 66.67 100
0 0 0 16.67 0 0 0 0 0 0 33.33 0
100 50 66.67 66.67 66.67 33.33 66.67 66.67 50 66.67 16.67 50Where are you from? (%north, % center, % south)
0 50 33.33 16.67 33.33 66.67 33.33 33.33 50 33.33 50 50
Are you satisfied with the
amount you earned during the
experiment? (% no)
50 16.67 50 66.67 50 83.33 83.33 33.33 33.33 66.67 33.33 16.67
Were the instructions and the
experiment clear? (% no)
50 0 66.67 0 50 50 16.67 16.67 0 33.33 50 50
Do you think that you would
have earned more if you had
more experience with this
game? (% yes)
16.67 33.33 33.33 0 16.67 16.67 0 0 0 0 50 33.33
Do you like to share things
with your friends? (% no)
16.67 33.33 16.67 33.33 16.67 33.33 33.33 0 0 33.33 16.67 33.33
You have forgotten your
watch in the university
lavatories. Do you expect that
you will find it there when
you go back? (% no)
16.67 16.67 16.67 83.33 83.33 83.33 83.33 100 100 50 83.33 83.33
You have lost your wallet on
a bus. Do you expect it will
be given back to you? (% no)
66.67 50 50 83.33 50 50 16.67 83.33 100 100 50 66.67
You are sharing a lottery
ticket with some friends, but
the ticket is with them. In
case you win, do you expect
that your friends will share
the prize? (% no)
33.33 33.33 16.67 16.67 0 0 33.33 0 0 16.67 0 0
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D ependen t V ariab le: am oun t that i sends to  j
C oeffic ien t S td . E rror P-V alu e
links o f i  in sess ion  (cum ) 1 .20 3 .04 0 .694
links o f j  in sess ion  (cum ) -3 .68 4 .71 0 .438
i  p roposed  to j  in  sess ion  (cum ) 25 .66 12 .97 0 .054
i  fa iled  w ith j in  session (cum ) -1 .29 19 .76 0 .948
i’s p ro fit in  netw ork  gam e -0 .017 0 .026 0 .515
h igh  cost sess ion 138 .57 91 .77 0 .138
F em ale -84 .71 87 .70 0 .339
H as b ro ther o r s ister -5 .59 76 .89 0 .942
N orth 83 .69 126 .58 0 .512
S ou th -66 .79 56 .28 0 .241
N ot h appy  to  sh are -136 .86 97 .42 0 .167
D oes no t expec t to  f ind  w atch 90 .67 87 .98 0 .308
D oes  not expec t to  have  back w allet 18 .51 71 .29 0 .796
D oes  not expec t to  share  lo tte ry p rize -100 .57 62 .48 0 .114
U nsatis fied 60 .92 73 .28 0 .410
E xperience -95 .72 102 .15 0 .354
C onstan t 89 .77 172 .24 0 .605
N um ber o f observations: 63
R 2     0 .3797 R obust standard  e rro rs
Amount o¤ered, OLS regression with demographics and trust indicators,
treatments 1 and 2.
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D ep e n d e n t  V ar ia b le : am o u n t th a t j re tu rn s to  i
C o e f fic ien t S td . E r ro r P -V a lu e
am o u n t o f fe re d  b y i 0 .4 0 0 .1 1 0 .0 0 1
lin k s  o f i  in se s s io n  (c u m ) -4 .8 5 1 .7 5 0 .0 0 8
lin k s  o f j  in se ss io n  (c u m ) 0 .7 8 1 .6 2 0 .6 3 2
j  p ro p o s ed  to i  in  s es s io n  (cu m ) -7 .0 8 4 .9 3 0 .1 5 8
j  fa ile d  w ith i  in  se ss io n  (c u m ) -7 .1 9 9 .6 8 0 .4 6 1
j’s p ro f it in  n e tw o rk  g a m e -0 .0 3 0 .0 2 0 .1 2 6
h ig h  co s t  se ss io n -1 8 7 .9 9 5 4 .6 9 0 .0 0 1
F em a le -7 3 .6 0 4 3 .9 4 0 .1 0 1
H as  b ro th e r o r s is te r 2 1 .9 2 7 2 .5 9 0 .7 6 4
N o rth 3 0 .7 9 8 6 .2 7 0 .7 2 3
S o u th -2 9 .8 1 4 3 .8 4 0 .5 0 0
N o t h a p p y  to  s h a re -1 9 .6 4 5 2 .9 0 0 .7 1 2
D o e s  n o t e x p ec t to  f in d  w a tc h 1 8 .5 5 4 1 .0 3 0 .6 5 3
D o e s n o t e x p ec t to  h av e  b a ck  w a lle t 3 8 .0 4 4 1 .4 3 0 .3 6 3
D o e s  n o t e x p ec t to  sh a re  lo tte ry  p riz e 3 4 .0 3 5 6 .0 6 0 .5 4 7
U n s a tis f ie d -6 8 .9 2 4 0 .5 8 0 .0 9 6
E x p e r ie n c e 5 3 .6 0 5 0 .1 0 0 .2 9 0
C o n s ta n t 3 7 6 .5 9 1 1 1 .7 4 0 .0 0 2
N u m b e r o f  o b s e rv a tio n s : 6 3
R 2     0 .5 1 5 1 R o b u s t s ta n d a rd  e rro rs
Amount sent back, OLS regression with demographics and trust indicators,
treatments 1 and 2.
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Instructions (English Translation)
Welcome.
This experiment comprises two phases: you will play in sequence the network
game and the gifts game. You may be asked to play either the network game
rst and the gifts game second, or the gifts game rst and the network game
second. At the beginning of the experiment, your computer will tell you which
of the two games you are asked to play rst.
If you read carefully these simple instructions you will be able to earn a good
amount of money that will be paid to you in cash immediately at the end of the
experiment.
THE NETWORK GAME
The network game is an experiment on the formation of links among di¤erent
subjects.
You are one of the 6 participants in this experiment; at the beginning of
the experiment the computer will assign you an initial endowment of 500 ex-
perimental units and will randomly assign to you an icon (oppy, pen, radio,
hand-lens, hourglass, or cube). The icon that identies you is highlighted in red
on your screen.
The experiment will last a random number of rounds: there will be at least
15 rounds and, after the 15th, a lottery will be administered by the computer
in order to determine if the experiment will nish at that round or continue.
Each participant to the experiment represents a node. At the beginning of
the experiment all nodes are isolated. In each round you will be asked by the
computer if you want to connect to the other participants and to whom. You
have the possibility to initiate one, two or more links The computer will receive
all participants proposals and will activate only the links that are mutually
agreed. The graph of established connections will appear on your screen.
The window on the low right side of your screen will show you the proposals
your received in previous rounds but which you did not match.
Each active link has a cost (equal for all participants) which is shown in
the top window on your screen. In each round the computer will refuse your
linksproposals if the expenditure required for the links that your propose, when
activated, is greater than the budget that you have available to spend for that
round.
In each round the compute will calculate your revenues as the product be-
tween the unitary revenue (equal for all nodes and shown in the top window
on your screen) and the number of nodes that you will be able to reach both
through your own and other participants connections, as represented in the
following example.
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Computing costs and revenues
Example
Revenue per node:  100
Cost per link: 90
Cube Radio Pen
Floppy Hourglass Hand-lens
Radio’s profit is equal to:
total revenue – total cost
total revenue = reached nodes x revenue per node = 3 x 100 = 300
total cost = direct links x cost per link = 2 x 90 = 180
profit = 120
In each round the computer will calculate your prot and will display it on
your screen. The overall prot from the network game is given by the sum of
your prots in all rounds.
Your prot will be converted in euros on the basis of 100 experimental units
= 1 euro.
More in detail
At the beginning of the experiment please wait for instructions from the
experimenters.
You will nd the following screen:
The green bar at the top of this screen gives you all the relevant informa-
tion to the round you are about to play. In particular, it shows your initial
endowment, the cost per link and the revenue per node.
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In each round you will be able to choose to whom to propose a link by
clicking on the relevant boxes corresponding to each of the other participants,
in the window on the right hand side of your screen.
Be careful: every round will last at most the number of seconds indicated in
red in the box at the top right of your screen. If you fail to make a choice before
the given time, the computer will move you automatically to the next round.
At the end of each round the graph on the left hand side of your screen
will show you the links that you (deep green) and the other participants (light
green) have activated.
The table on the top is automatically updated and it shows you the results
you scored in each round. The current round is highlighted in blue. You can
click on the lines corresponding to the previous rounds to visualise again what
the network and your prots, costs and revenues were then. The window at
the bottom right of your screen provides you with additional information on
proposals that you have received in previous rounds and that you have not
matched.
At the end of each round, the computer will initiate a new round and you
will be able to choose again to whom to link. This will occur in sequence for the
rst 15 rounds; after the 15th round, your screen will show two ashing lights.
If they stop on green, you will have the chance to play another round; it they
stop on red the network game is over.
THE GIFTS GAME
At the beginning of the gifts game you will be assigned a bonus of 100
experimental units.
You will have the chance to o¤er part of this amount to one and only one
of the other players of your choice. The beneciary will receive the amount you
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o¤er multiplied by three. For example: if the player Pen decides to o¤er 300
units to the player Cube, the latter will receive 900 units.
The beneciary - player Cube in our example - will in turn have the chance
to give back to his donor some of the 900 units received (or even the whole
amount, but not more). If the beneciary does not want to give back anything,
he has to enter 0 in the relevant box.
Be careful: both you and your beneciary will have one and only one oppor-
tunity to o¤er and to give back.
To make your o¤er you will have to enter the desired amount in the box
corresponding to your chosen beneciary among the other participants to the
experiment. If you do not want to o¤er anything to anyone, enter zero in each
of the boxes. Remember that you will be able to make a positive o¤er to only
one of the other participants. Hence the computer will reject your o¤er if you
enter a positive amount in more than one box.
The prot you obtain in the gifts game is given by the di¤erence between
the initial bonus and the amount that you may have o¤ered to one of the other
participants, plus three times the amount that you may have been o¤ered by
one (or more) of the others net of what you may have decided to give back to
them.
Your prot will be converted in euros with a ratio of 100 experimental units
= 1 euro.
OVERALL PROFITS FOR THE EXPERIMENT
Your overall prots for the experiment are given by the sum of your prots
in the network game and in the gifts game.
It is very important that you make choices independently and that
you do not communicate with other participants during the
experimental session.
For any problem, please contact the experimenters.
We hope you will nd it fruitful.
Daniela Di Cagno
Emanuela Sciubba
April 2007.
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